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Constitutional politics is often contrasted with normal politics as being more 
deliberative and so able to produce a principled consensus rather than a compromise. 
This article qualifies this view. The authors argue that the potential exists for 
reasonable disagreement even over such basic constitutional principles as rights. As a 
result,a constitution can only be agreed by employing the arts of compromise typical 
of normal politics. Indeed, a prime role of constitutional politics lies in showing how  
conflicts can be normalised. The authors illustrate their argument via a detailed 
analysis of the various political compromises employed by the convention to draft the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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The draft Constitution for the European Union has been criticised in some quarters for 
being the product of low politics not high principle. Rather than aspiring to the 
elevated standards of deliberative argument supposedly set at Philadelphia, the 
Convention on the Future of Europe is charged with being characterised by shabby 
bargains to accommodate various sectional interests, especially those of member state 
governments. As a consequence, the resulting document lacks the clarity and 
                                                 
1   Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Universities of Chiba, Edinburgh and Essex 
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precision that could have been achieved had it issued from a rational consensus on 
common values and procedures. Instead, it is lengthy and overly complex, mixing 
empty verbosity with detailed and potentially unworkably complicated formulae that 
reflect a series of compromises designed to keep all the parties happy.  
  This chapter questions a key assumption underlying such criticisms 
concerning the need to distinguish ‘constitutional’ from’ normal’ politics. These two 
forms of politics are often treated as distinct species of the same genus.
 2 Whereas the 
latter supposedly involves a focus on policy considerations and the promotion, 
balancing and aggregation of sectional interests, the former is portrayed as a more 
high-minded affair. It consists of deliberation on the common good to arrive at a 
consensus on those principles required to show each person equal concern and 
respect.
3 As such, it comes as close as possible to the ideal politics of an original 
contract between free and equal citizens. Proponents of this interpretation maintain 
that if everyone is constrained to reason in an open and equitable manner, 
uninfluenced by purely private advantage, prejudice or other kinds of unjustifiable 
partiality, the contractors will converge on a conception of justice that is both fair and 
in the public interest. By contrast, normal politics is said to be the realm of shabby 
compromises, in which self-interested parties bargain for personal or sectional gain, 
only accepting what they have to in order to get as much of their way as they can.
4 
Consequently, the outcomes of constitutional politics – most notably constitutional 
                                                 
2   E.g. B Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1991, pp. 3-33. 
3   E.g. J Elster, Argomentare e negoziare, Milan: Anabasi, 1996; J Cohen, ‘Procedure and 
Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, in S. Benhabib (ed), Democracy and Difference, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 95-119. 
4   E.g. J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pp. 127, 165-7, 181-83.   
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rights – provide the preconditions for normal politics and may legitimately constrain 
it.
5  
We dispute this contrast and the relationship it proposes between these two political 
settings. We do not wish to deny that, just as certain concerns of contemporary 
eighteenth century politics, most notably slavery, occasionally marred the proceedings 
at Philadelphia of two centuries ago, so the Brussels convention was sometimes 
unduly preoccupied by passing issues or the need to conciliate particular interests. 
One does not have to be a cynical realist to expect any real political process to fall 
short in some measure from the ideal. However, there are also many occasions when 
conflicting views and interests cannot but be taken into account. As we shall show, 
disagreements over matters of constitutional principle are often reasonable and 
involve policy differences that cannot be ignored. In these cases, political deals have 
to be struck to achieve a compromise. In these respects, there are often good reasons 
for constitution making to resemble the ordinary process of legislation. 
   Constitutional politics are typically linked to dramatic ‘moments’ such as a 
civil war, revolution, military defeat or some other national disaster or major turning 
point.
6 In these cases, it is necessary to rebuild the structures of normal politics and 
normalise the antagonisms of opposed groups. Less dramatic instances, such as the 
three rounds of constitutional politics in Canada since the mid-1960s, have had 
similar aspirations – namely, to bring antipathy to the prevailing regime within the 
fold of normal politics. We contend this process of normalisation arises not because 
constitutional politics stands outside and differs from normal politics, but on the 
contrary because it reveals that conflicts on matters of principle are amenable to the 
                                                 
5   E.g. R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996, Introduction. 
6   Ackerman, We the People, pp. 266-94.   
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normal political processes. Disagreements about constitutional principles are 
frequently well founded, both reflecting and lying at the heart of normal political 
divisions. Consequently, a consensus beyond these political disputes is not available. 
Rather, mechanisms have to be found whereby people can live with their 
disagreements. As a result, constitutional politics reaches an accord not through some 
or all disputants being converted to a common point of view, but via a normal 
political process of give and take that allows the parties to reach mutually acceptable 
compromises in which each recognises the views of others without necessarily 
agreeing with them. As with ordinary legislation, there need be nothing shabby about 
such deals.
7 They involve a complex mix of bargaining and principled argument that 
belies attempts to distinguish normal from constitutional politics by associating the 
former exclusively with the first and the latter with the second. Politics tout court 
necessarily employs elements of both, combining them in different ways according to 
the nature of the issue being discussed, so as to find solutions all can live with. 
  Our analysis focuses on the preceding convention that drafted the EU Charter 
of Rights, which has been adopted more or less unchanged as Part II of the draft 
Constitution.
8 This earlier convention was broadly welcomed and its perceived 
success to some degree encouraged the use of the convention method to tackle the 
broader issue of institutional reform through the writing of a constitution. Moreover, 
                                                 
7   While we can only examine the normality of constitutional politics here, we would equally 
wish to insist on normal legislative politics having many of the qualities reserved by some to 
abnormal constitutional deliberations (see J. Waldron on The Dignity of Legislation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1999). However, we would also want to stress that 
even on matters of principle, politics cannot be too high flown. To resolve principled 
disagreements that defy any consensus, we often need to use a range of bargaining and 
procedural techniques to achieve a compromise.  
8   The main change is that the British have pushed through the incorporation of the Praesidium’s 
explanatory notes into the body of the Charter (Part II, Title VII, Arts II-51-54, CONV 
850/03, pp. 59-60) largely because these were taken as limiting its ‘scope’ more clearly to EU 
institutions and policies (see the White Paper ‘A Constitutional Treaty for the EU: The British 
Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 2003’, Cm5934, p. 39 para 
102). There is also now a commitment to attempt to accede to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Part 1 Title II Art 7 para 2, CONV 850/03, p. 8)   
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it had matters of principle at its heart and was less subject to external political 
interference and scrutiny. If ordinary political considerations and processes justifiably 
played a role here, we should not be surprised that they should have an even greater 
part in the later convention. The first section considers the nature of constitutional 
rights. We argue that because rights are subject to reasonable disagreements about 
their substance, scope and sphere, the subjects to whom they apply, and the ways they 
might be specified and secured, the conditions of public reason held to typify 
‘constitutional’ politics will be insufficient to produce a consensus. The second 
section explores how these differences may nevertheless be resolved through various 
types of normal political compromise. The third section illustrates these points 
through an analysis of the Convention. We conclude by suggesting the success of this, 
as with other, conventions lay not in its extraordinary character so much as its 
normality. As a consequence, we ought perhaps to treat its conclusions as part of, and 
reformable by, normal politics too, rather than according them the superior status 
standardly attributed to the Charters and other agreements resulting from such 
meetings.  
 
Rights and the Circumstances of Politics 
Though most people agree that rights are rendered necessary by the limited altruism 
and resources that Rawls (following Hume) termed the ‘circumstances of justice’,
9 
many disagree about which rights these are, their nature, bearing and relationship to 
each other. Does the right to life rule out abortion; how far does the right to property 
restrict transfer payments for welfare; when, if ever, should freedom of speech give 
way to privacy? The list of potential divisions over the meaning and application of 
                                                 
9   J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 126-30.   
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rights appears endless. This predicament poses a problem for the constitutional rights 
project. If we need rights because of the ‘circumstances of justice’, it appears that we 
have to identify and interpret them in what Jeremy Waldron, among others, has called 
the ‘circumstances of politics’: namely, a situation where we require a collectively 
binding agreement, because we will suffer without it, yet opinions and interests 
diverge as to what its character should be and no single demonstrably ‘best’ solution 
is available.
10 Many proponents of constitutional rights seek clear and settled answers 
that brook no debate because based on a consensus on justice. As such, they are 
supposed to be beyond politics, offering legitimate constraints upon it. However, if 
there are reasonable disagreements about truth and justice, then a political process 
will be needed to resolve them. Constitutional rights will not be outside or even, as 
may be partly the case, presuppositions of politics.
11 They will be products of the very 
political bargaining they are supposed to frame. 
It is sometimes objected that such disagreements over rights arise solely from 
self-interest, ignorance or prejudice leading people to seek to perpetuate various 
sources of injustice. Wittingly or unwittingly, this is no doubt often the case. Yet, as 
John Rawls has observed, they also arise from what he calls `the burdens of 
judgement, … the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise 
of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life.’
12 
Rawls lists the following six `more obvious’ (and, in his view, least controversial) 
                                                 
10   J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 107-18, A. 
Weale, Democracy, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 8-13. 
11   Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms probably represents the most sophisticated attempt to 
derive rights from democratic procedures. However, though certain rights can be regarded as 
implied by politics, such as the right to vote, even these can be subject to reasonable 
disagreements as to whom they apply and how they might be institutionalized (for detailed 
criticisms of this thesis, see R Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of 
Compromise, London: Routledge, 1999, Ch 7, Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Ch 13.) As 
we shall see, these debates arose in the Convention. Meanwhile, not all rights are tied to 
political procedures, even when broadly conceived. 
12   J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993, pp. 55-56.   
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factors as contributing to a divergence of judgement amongst reasonable people: 1) 
the difficulty of identifying and assessing often complicated empirical evidence; 2) 
disagreement about the weighting of different considerations even when there is 
agreement about which are relevant; 3) the vagueness and indeterminacy of our 
concepts, which makes them subject to hard cases; 4) the effect of the different life 
experiences of people, which in complex societies vary widely, on the ways they 
assess evidence and weigh moral and political values; 5) the different kinds of 
normative consideration, each with different force, on both sides of an issue, which 
make overall assessments problematic; and 6) the impossibility of any social and 
political system being able to accommodate all values.
13  
Rawls cites these six factors as making it impossible to base a stable political 
settlement on a consensus around a comprehensive conception of the good. Yet, as a 
number of commentators have remarked,
14 they raise equal doubts about a consensus 
on the right. For example, think of the debates over breaches of privacy. It is often 
difficult to identify such breaches because not only may the empirical details be 
unclear but also (and most importantly) people differ over the boundaries of the 
concept, hold different accounts of the public interest and where it overrides the right 
to privacy, view personal responsibility differently and so on. As a result, they may 
even have different views of when a right exists to be breached in the first place. 
Indeed, the laws in many states diverge on this point. For example, France and 
Germany protect the privacy of public figures more than Britain or the United States.  
Thus, rights appear subject to many of the divisions animating political debate 
more generally. Indeed, these disagreements extend to the very concept of a right. For 
example, `choice’ and `benefit’ approaches produce very different accounts of the 
                                                 
13   Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 56-57. 
14   E.g. B. Bower, ‘The Limits of Public Reason’, Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), p. 21.   
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nature of rights, with this theoretical debate mirroring many political arguments 
amongst the wider public, such as those between libertarians and welfarists. Broadly 
speaking, we can say that disagreements can arise over the substance of rights, or 
which rights we have and why, the subjects of rights, or who may possess them, the 
sphere of rights, or where they apply – only in the public sphere, or also to private 
associations, the scope of rights, or how they relate to other rights and values, and the 
securing and specification of rights, or the type of political or judicial intervention 
and the precise set of entitlements that are needed to protect them, both in general and 
in particular cases. Though analytically distinct, these dimensions are related so that 
the interpretation given of any one of them will have knock-on effects for how all the 
others are conceived.
15 
  To some degree, these six dimensions of rights can be seen as defining the 
contours of the political. A given view of rights will, explicitly or implicitly, identify 
certain sorts of agents and groups of people as citizens and describe the public realm 
in a particular way. For instance, moral and economic libertarians will be likely to 
have a narrower view of the legitimate range of political activity than social 
democrats, even if in some respects they might be willing to extend citizenship within 
this severely circumscribed range to a wider group of people. As such, one could 
describe arguments about rights as a form of ‘constitutional’ politics since they 
concern the very constitution of the political. Yet, as the example given above 
illustrates, they are also intimately related to the issues that engage people within 
‘normal’, everyday politics. To a greater or lesser degree, most policies involve taking 
a view on one or more of the dimensions of rights and this stance will reflect the 
                                                 
15   For a full analysis of debates over these dimensions of rights, see R. Bellamy, ‘Constitutive 
Citizenship versus Constitutional Rights: Republican Reflections on the EU Charter and the 
Human Rights Act’, in T. Campbell, K. D. Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on 
Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, especially pp. 17-21.   
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ideological position, interests and experiences of those concerned. In other words, the 
standard divisions of ‘normal’ politics, which lead conservatives and social democrats 
to divide over education, health, immigration and so on, are related to many of the 
reasonable disagreements people have about rights. Indeed, these latter disagreements 
about rights inform their debates on policies. Consequently, ‘normal’ and 
‘constitutional’ politics are intertwined. A constitutional settlement will tend to reflect 
what could be ‘normally’ agreed at the point at which it was framed. As such, it is 
likely to be at issue and subject to subsequent reinterpretation as normal politics 
evolves. Thus, we should not be surprised if normal divisions and strategies enter 
constitutional politics or that normal politics proves more adept at dealing with 
constitutional questions than many have supposed. Indeed, the very purpose of 
constitutional politics may be to appreciate the normality of these divisions and the 
need to live with them. 
 
The Politics of Compromise 
In circumstances of reasonable disagreement, deliberation will not produce consensus. 
There is no better argument none can reasonably reject and no compelling reason for 
anyone to transform their position to adopt another’s. We submit people overcome 
this impasse by dropping consensus for mutual acceptability and employing the arts 
of compromise to reach an agreement.
16 Compromise is usually characterised as the 
product of shabby deals based on self-interest. By contrast, we argue it reflects a 
willingness to ‘hear the other sides’ by acknowledging their reasonableness, without 
                                                 
16   This section summarises Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, Ch. 4. See too M. Benjamin, 
Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics, Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1990.   
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necessarily denying that of one’s own position, and addressing the often competing 
claims of the parties concerned.  
  Roughly speaking there are three kinds of compromise, with the version 
adopted depending on the character of the parties and the differences dividing them. 
The first kind seeks a direct compromise between the different viewpoints. One of the 
commonest methods consists of bargaining and arises in what Albert Hirschman has 
called ‘more-or-less’ conflicts.
17 In these cases, the disputants are either arguing over 
a single good whose meaning they share, or are able to conceive their various 
demands as being translatable into some common measure - usually money. Thus, 
when employees haggle over wages or house buyers over the price of their 
prospective home, they may have issues other than money in mind – such as the need 
to work late or the proximity of a railway line in these two examples - but they can 
nevertheless put a price on their concern that enables the parties to agree a mutually 
satisfactory deal. However, many conflicts cannot be resolved so easily because the 
positions are incommensurable or incompatible with each other. In these instances, 
more complex compromises are required. A more sophisticated style of bargaining 
involves trading to mutual advantage, whereby each gets some if not all of what they 
want. For example, most political parties have to engage in a degree of log-rolling to 
get elected. This procedure brings into a single party various groups that may disagree 
over many issues but who prioritise them differently. If three groups are split over the 
possession of nuclear weapons, development aid and a graduate tax, but each values a 
different one of these more than the others, it may be possible for them to agree to a 
package giving each the policy they value most while putting up with another with 
which they disagree in an area that matters less to them. Of course, sometimes the 
                                                 
17   Albert Hirschman, `Social Conflict as Pillars of Democratic Market Society', Political Theory, 22 
(1994), pp. 203-18   
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result can be a programme that is too inconsistent to be tenable or attractive. Here, it 
might be better for the groups to shift to an agreed second best. Some conflicts appear 
intractable at the level of abstract principle but can be resolved through the 
negotiation of the details. What appear to be stand-offs between incompatible views 
sometimes arise through the various positions being under articulated. Thick 
description may help clarify the distinctive weight of different demands. Each party 
may agree that reasons of different weight or involving different sorts of 
consideration are involved. Or it may be possible to reason casuistically and by 
analogy from those cases where there is agreement to others where abstractly there 
appears to be a stand-off. Judges often use precedents in this way.
18 
The second kind of compromise consists of various attempts to skirt around 
the disagreement. For example, people often employ trimming to avoid talking about 
the issues that divide them and seek either to find agreement on other grounds or to 
take them off the agenda altogether. This technique resembles the way neighbours of 
opposed religious beliefs steer clear of discussing religion so as to remain sufficiently 
friendly to cooperate on school runs. It is partly employed by Rawls when advocating 
the avoidance of ‘comprehensive’ moral theories in politics,
19 and is familiar in 
constitutions in the form of ‘gag-rules’.
20 From this perspective, the very decision to 
have a Bill of Rights can be regarded as a compromise agreement to remove certain 
divisive issues from the political agenda. A variation of this technique is segregation. 
Here the attempt is to contain potentially conflicting issues or differing groups of 
people by placing them within distinct spheres. Granting ethnic or national minorities 
                                                 
18   C. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, New York: Oxford university Press, 
1996. 
19   Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. xvii, 141-4. 
20   S. Holmes, ‘Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission’, in J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds), 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 19-58; 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 151, note 16.   
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limited forms of self-government and consociational forms of democracy provide 
examples of this approach.  
The third kind of compromise employs a procedural device to overcome 
deadlock. Third party arbitration is one common mechanism of this kind, where trust 
is placed in the arbitrator to do the balancing in an impartial manner according to a 
fixed set of rules. Majority voting is another example of this approach. In this case, 
the disputants compromise on a procedure they all accept as fair even if they will 
continue to disagree on the merits of the actual decision itself. Such methods appear 
justified wherever agreement on substance seems unlikely because of time constraints 
or the character of the differences dividing the parties. 
All three kinds of compromise, along with their variants, are standard political 
techniques and frequently combined. Each has its respective merits and demerits, 
according to the issue and the perspectives of the people concerned. Take religious 
education in a multicultural society. Trading might yield ecumenical solutions or 
concessions in other areas that certain religious groups regard as more important, such 
as special rights like Britain’s exemption of Sikhs from wearing crash helmets on 
motorcycles. Or it might be better to trim or establish as a shared second best that 
schools are strictly secular. Societies that are deeply segmented along religious lines 
have often adopted various forms of segregation, such as consociationalism.
21 
Sometimes a minority group engages in negotiation to get accepted. For example, 
British Muslims have pointed to analogies with established liberal or Christian 
practices to get certain of their claims recognised as legitimate and to promote 
understanding of them.
22  
                                                 
21   A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 
Berkely: University of California Press, 1968. 
22   T. Modood, ‘Kymlicka on British Muslims’, Analyse und Kritik, 15 (1993), pp. 87-91.   
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Whereas the ideal of consensus suggests that constitutional politics should act 
as a funnel to produce agreement on some ideally just arrangement, the need to 
compromise simply acts as a filter, weeding out the most blatantly unjust and self-
serving positions that fail to treat others with equal concern and respect. Moreover, 
while consensus aspires to a fixed point above normal political divisions, 
compromises necessarily reflect them. They differ according to context and evolve as 
people’s circumstances and views change. Therefore, if compromise rather than 
consensus has to form the goal of constitutional politics, it will resemble normal 
politics not just in its processes but also in its decisions. For they will mirror the 
prevailing differences.  
It will be objected that compromise will only be fair if the relative power of 
the parties concerned is so divided that all get a hearing but none has the ability to 
force concessions to meet perverse or unjust claims. In fact, compromise shares the 
concern with political equality that animates democracy. Namely, it ‘requires the view 
that we must recognise everybody with whom we communicate as a potential source 
of argument and reasonable information.’
23 It is vital, therefore, that different view 
points are fairly represented in the decision-making process. One advantage of 
constitutional over normal politics may be that this is more likely to be the case. As 
we shall see was the case in the Convention, different view points tend to be so 
represented that even minority positions get a hearing, while the public character of 
their deliberations and the need for near unanimity encourage participants to appeal to 
shareable reasons rather then prejudice or self-interest when making their arguments. 
However, here too the difference between constitutional and normal politics is largely 
a matter of degree rather than of kind. Most political systems seek to ensure fair and 
                                                 
23   Weale, Democracy, p. 57.   
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reasonable decision-making through adopting a suitably proportional electoral system, 
drawing constituency boundaries in certain ways, dividing legislative power and so 
on.
24  
The critique of majoritarianism, the most common objection to normal 
politics, needs qualifying in this regard. An insistence on unanimity may give small 
groups an effective veto over decisions that amounts to minority tyranny – a fear we 
shall show some voiced in the Convention. By contrast, majority voting can be the 
fairest decision procedure, as May famously showed,
 25 and, as Condorcet revealed,
26 
may be more likely to be right than individual judgement. Of course, both these 
results assume ideal conditions that rarely obtain in practice.
27 However, for this 
reason strict majoritarianism is unusual in real political systems. Most legislatures are 
elected via systems that produce multiple parties and a degree of representativeness 
that makes coalition building necessary.
 28 As pluralists have long noted, even within 
dominant parties majorities get constructed from minorities. Legislative majorities are 
often in reality super-majorities of the population as a whole, reflecting a wide 
spectrum of public opinion. Thus, the structures of constitutional politics are also 
closer to those of normal politics than is sometimes granted. 
 
Compromising on Rights: An Analysis of the Charter Convention 
                                                 
24   For a survey of how different forms of representation ensure minorities reach a sufficient 
threshold to have a voice, see A. Phillips, The Politics of Presence, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 
25   K. May, ‘A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority 
Decision’, Econometrica 10 (1952), pp. 680-84 
26   Marquis de Condorcet, ‘Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision-
Making’, in K. M. Baker (ed), Condorcet: Selected Writings, Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 
1976. 
27   R. A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 144-50, 
160-62. 
28   Lijphart’s analysis of 21 stable democracies revealed only 6 as conforming to this pattern (A 
Lijphart, Democracies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, and Dahl’s remarks in 
Democracy and its Critics, pp. 156-60).   
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We have argued that constitutional politics raises normal political disagreements and 
so must adopt the procedures of normal politics to overcome them, albeit refining 
some of its structures to do so. This section presents a case study to show how the 
Convention to draft the Charter of Rights employed the politics of compromise. The 
decision to draft the Charter originated during Germany’s Presidency of the EU in 
1999 and reflected a growing sensitivity to rights issues within the Union.
29 This 
concern had numerous sources – the long-standing challenges to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) on this issue from the constitutional courts of member states,
 30 the 
desire to uphold human rights standards in the face of the rise of far-right parties and 
the prospective enlargement to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,
31 
and the belief that highlighting rights would demonstrate the EU’s commitment to the 
central principles of good governance.
 32 Though these triggers do not amount to a 
constitutional moment of a dramatic kind, they were aspects of a widespread feeling 
that the EU faced a legitimacy crisis that would inhibit its capacity to confront the 
challenges posed by the deepening and widening of the EU occasioned by the Euro 
and enlargement. However, like other EU attempts to legitimise itself, the Charter was 
originally conceived as addressing supposed weaknesses of popular perception more 
than of policy.
33 As the conclusions of the Cologne European Council meeting of June 
1999 establishing the initiative made clear, the Charter was to be addressed to 
                                                 
29   G. de Búrca. `The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’, European 
Law Review, 26 (2001), pp. 128-31.  
30   See J. H. H. Weiler ‘The Reform of European Constitutionalism’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 35, (1997), pp 97-131 
31   Michael Merlingen, Cas Mudde and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘The Right and the Righteous? 
European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sanctions against Austria’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 39 (2001), pp 59-77 
32   European Commission “White Paper on Good Governance”, COM (2001) 428, Brussels 2001 
33   Reports in 1998 and 1999 had proposed improving the attention paid to rights by setting up a 
specific Commission directorate for human rights and formally acceding to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (European Parliament ‘Leading by Example – A 
Human Rights Agenda for the European Union in the Year 2000’, (Lalumiere Report), 
Brussels 1998; Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1999). However, neither proposal met with political support.   
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European citizens rather than EU institutions and personnel. Its purpose was to make 
the Union’s existing ‘obligation … to respect fundamental rights’, as ‘confirmed and 
defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice’, ‘more visible to the Union’s 
citizens’.
34 Accordingly, drafters were directed to those sources the ECJ currently 
employed when adjudicating on rights, notably the supposedly ‘common 
constitutional traditions’ of the member states, the European Convention, the 
European Social Charter and the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers. Whether the Charter would become legally binding was left open.
35 
  Such attempts to constrain constitution-making bodies are not untypical.
36 
Established authorities rarely welcome a potential subversion of their existing powers. 
However, like most past constituent assemblies, the Convention refused to be bound 
by upstream authorities.
37 The very adoption of the term Convention to describe itself, 
the official documents having referred simply to a ‘body’, was a declaration of intent 
to draft a founding document rather than just showcase existing entitlements, though 
how far it could go was a point of contention throughout its proceedings. Meanwhile, 
the status of the document was neatly shelved by the Convention President’s decision 
to draft the Charter ‘as if’ it would become binding.
38 Though this policy was also 
contested, it lead to all the participants taking the process seriously enough to avoid it 
becoming simply a wish-list of campaigning groups, a fate that can befall 
international declarations that lack the backing or involvement of governments. 
                                                 
34   Conclusions of Cologne European Council Meeting 3-4.06.1999, Annex IV 
35   Conclusions of Cologne European Council meeting, 3-4.06.1999 
36   J Elster, ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’, in J. Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 99. 
37   Elster, ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’, pp. 105-07. 
38   Roman Herzog set out this idea in Convention Document 'Body 3' of 20.01.2000.   
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  The Convention conformed to the ideal conditions for a democratic 
deliberative setting as nearly as is realistically possible.
39 Its size was reasonably 
optimal. With 62 members it was not so large that it favoured oratory over argument, 
with those speakers most versed in rhetoric coming to the fore. Rather, all members 
could participate in discussion. Even if there was minimal direct consultation with the 
electorate over their deliberations or its conclusions, the Convention was more than 
usually representative of European public opinion in terms of the range of ideologies 
and interests it included and consulted. Like EU decision-making more generally, the 
Convention involved national, transnational and supranational representatives, along 
with formal and informal consultations with subnational groups.
40 However, 
unusually the weighting was towards parliamentarians in the national and European 
parliaments, who accounted respectively for 30 (or two each, usually from the main 
government and opposition parties) and 16 of the 62 representatives. By contrast, 
member state governments and the Commission only had one representative, making 
16 in all. Nevertheless, only 16% were female and all were white. Two 
representatives each from the Council of Europe and the ECJ had observer status, and 
the European Council had indicated that other European bodies, such as the 
Ombudsman, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, 
be invited to give their views and an ‘appropriate exchange’ be entered into with the 
candidate countries for Union membership.
41 In addition, the Convention was 
                                                 
39   The discussion the follows employs the criteria Elster derives from his analysis of the 
Philadelphia, Paris and Frankfurt conventions in ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’, pp. 
107, 117. For a similar appraisal, see de Búrca. `The Drafting of the European Union Charter’, 
pp. 131-34. 
40   Given that regions often have some constitutional independence, their involvement was weak 
- the only formal requirement being to consult the Committee of the Regions (Conclusions of 
the Tampere Council 15/16.10.1999, Annex, A iv). However, where, as in Germany, the 
second house is a federal chamber, the national parliamentary delegations included a regional 
representative. 
41   Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 3./4.06.1999, Annex IV.   
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encouraged but not required to invite ‘other bodies, social groups, or experts’ to give 
their views.
42 Though most Convention members belonged to institutions potentially 
affected by the Charter, most lacked a strong interest in preventing it undermining 
these bodies. They were either senior figures nearing retirement, middle ranking 
politicians unlikely to achieve major office, or, in the case of certain governmental 
representatives, relatively independent academics or lawyers. 
The European Council specified that the debates and hearings of the body and 
the documents submitted to it should be public, and a dedicated website made the 
proceedings reasonably easy to follow from outside and allowed submissions from 
any interested individual or group. Most debates were held in open, plenary sessions. 
As a result, the process was public enough to ensure transparency and oblige 
participants, however hypocritically, to employ the language of impartial reason 
rather than of mere self-interest. But its meetings were not so publicized as to 
encourage grandstanding and rhetorical overbidding aimed at courting or palliating 
groups outside the convention. Moreover, if total secrecy encourages bargaining, 
partial secrecy can allow free and frank discussion. A key role in this respect was 
played by the praesidium, which met in secret and placed drafts before the 
Convention to amend or accept. It consisted of a chair, Roman Herzog, a former 
president of both the federal republic of Germany and its Federal Constitutional 
Court, who was chosen by the Convention, and three vice-chairs chosen respectively 
by the national parliamentarians, the European parliamentarians, and the 
representatives of the member state governments (who were represented by the 
delegate of whichever state held the rotating EU presidency at the time). It acted as a 
                                                 
42   Ibid, spelled out further in Conclusions of Tampere European Council, 15-16.10.1999, Annex.   
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third party arbitrator, brokering compromises that their declared commitments 
hindered the participants from reaching directly themselves.  
Finally, the Convention had a strong incentive to reach a mutually acceptable 
outcome. The Council had ordained that a draft Charter was to be presented for 
approval ‘when the chairperson … deems that the text of the draft Charter elaborated 
by the body can eventually be subscribed to by all the parties.’
43 The Convention’s 
chair, Roman Herzog, took this instruction to mean that votes on individual proposals 
were to be avoided and that decision-making should be as consensual as possible. 
This interpretation was not uncontentious, and was felt by some to obscure real 
divisions and by others to give too much power to minority opinions.
44 Still, the final 
draft was approved by a ‘consensus minus two’ at the plenary.
45 
However, notwithstanding these near optimal discursive conditions, this 
apparent constitutional consensus actually consisted of a series of normal 
compromises aimed less at normative agreement than mutual acceptability. The 
Convention debates reveal cleavages over all six dimensions of rights. A major divide 
concerned the legitimate sphere of the Union’s activity. Some, like the British 
government’s representative Lord Peter Goldsmith, maintained ‘the task of this 
Convention is to make existing rights at European Union level more visible’.
46 They 
                                                 
43   Conclusions of Tampere European Council, 15-16.10.1999. 
44   For a critical view, see Johannes Voggenhuber “Die Wahrheit ist bloß eine Behauptung”, in 
Sylvia Kaufmann (ed) Die Grundrechtecharta der Europäischen Union, Bonn: Europa-Union 
Verlag, 2001. On one occasion, the attempt by the acting chairman Mendez de Vigo to put a 
presidium proposal to a vote nearly led to a walk-out of a large number of Convention 
members who insisted that votes were not allowed under the Cologne/Tampere mandates 
(debates on document Conv 36/00 on 06.06.2000, as summarized in Deutscher Bundestag, 
Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, Berlin, 2001, p. 285.) 
45   The last plenary meeting of the Convention took place on 02.10.2000 during which the 
‘consensus of the Convention on the draft Charter of Fundamental rights was declared by the 
Convention’s president to the applause of all but two delegates. 
46   Lord Peter Goldsmith in an interview on 17.07. 2000 and his ‘Consolidation of Fundamental 
Rights at EU-level – the British Perspective’, in K. Feus (ed) The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, Federal Trust, London, 2000. Interview data comes from Justus Schönlau, "The EU   
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wished to restrict the Charter to those rights derived from the sources to which the 
Council had referred them for guidance. Others, like the Italian government’s 
delegate, Stefano Rodotà, thought the Charter should go beyond the ECHR and give 
‘substance to European citizenship’.
47 They wanted to draft a new and substantially 
wider document that extended into areas not covered by earlier instruments, such as 
biotechnology, and that might even provide the foundation of a future federal 
European polity. As a result, the debate over the EU’s sphere partially overlapped 
with familiar philosophical and ideological differences over the substance of rights. 
Some wanted social rights included, others viewed them as policy choices that lie 
within (and must be compatible with) a domain established by civil and political 
rights. This debate was also related to discussions over whether all rights, some or 
none should extend to subjects other than citizens of the Union (a status currently 
restricted to nationals of the member states). Some considered fundamental rights as 
logically including all humans, others considered them as attributes of citizenship. 
Different accounts of the nature of rights also tend to produce divergent 
understandings of the scope of various categories. Not surprisingly, conservative 
parties tended to emphasise market based and process rights protecting formal 
equality, while social democrats favoured placing social rights on a par with 
traditional civil and political rights as necessary to ensure these were of equal worth 
to all. These differences also informed the major divisions over the status of the 
Charter and how, if at all, it should be secured. Some insisted the Charter should be 
legally binding, others contended the Cologne conclusions had made clear it would 
                                                                                                                                            
Charter of Fundamental Rights: Legitimation through Deliberation", PhD-thesis, University of 
Reading, Reading 2001. 
47   Stefano Rodotà in an interview on 04.04.2000.   
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only be declaratory. Naturally, all these issues had an impact on the way the various 
rights came to be specified. 
Significantly, the Convention did not divide into two distinct groups of 
minimalists and maximalists, with debates so polarised between them that 
compromise became difficult. Because a maximalist on matters of substance might be 
a minimalist over which subjects or spheres should be included, there were cross-
cutting divisions. The groups who agreed or disagreed about one dimension differed 
from those who agreed or disagreed over another. Nor was a maximalist position 
necessarily always the most just, with all detractions from it being motivated by 
national or group self-interest rather than principle. To a large extent, disagreements 
took place in the context of general agreement on the importance of rights. All 
member states are signatories of the ECHR, along with other international 
instruments, and possess some form of domestic bill of rights. Though special 
interests may have motivated some arguments, this applied as much to maximalist as 
to minimalist positions. However, most divisions mirrored, albeit at a lower level of 
sophistication, debates in the academic literature between cosmopolitans and liberal 
nationalist communitarians, Kantians and utilitarians, choice and benefit theorists and 
so on. In other words, they are rights-based differences between and over the nature 
of rights rather than between proponents and opponents of rights. 
  The solution to these disagreements lay in the types of compromise outlined 
above. Forms of bargaining that simply split the difference proved possible to a 
remarkable degree. For example, the substantive debate between proponents and 
opponents of workers’ rights reached a compromise whereby the proposal for a ‘right 
to work’, in the sense of an entitlement to a job, became modified to the more free 
market sounding ‘freedom to choose an occupation and a right to engage in work’   
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(Article 15). Other compromises in this area involved trading, whereby a package was 
agreed giving each side some of what it wanted. Thus, a deal was done whereby 
Article 29 establishing a right of access to a free placement service was included in 
return for a relatively open-ended ‘right to own, use, dispose or bequeath his or her 
lawfully acquired possessions’ and the recognition of the ‘freedom to conduct a 
business’ (Articles 17 and 16 respectively).
48 Part of the controversy surrounding 
social rights arose from many aspects of social policy not falling within the EU’s 
current competence.
 49 Consequently, even those who substantively favoured social 
rights did not necessarily support them in the Charter because they did not wish to 
expand the Union’s sphere. Here too trading offered the solution, with Articles 51 and 
52 representing a compromise of this kind that gave something to both minimalist and 
maximalist stances on this issue. The former gain by the first article, which limits the 
Charter’s application to EU institutions and the implementation of EU law by the 
member states (51: 1) while explicitly ruling out the creation of any new competence 
(51: 2). However, the latter gain by the second article, which indicates that limitations 
on these rights are not justified by the subsidiarity principle (52: 1) and that when they 
coincide with rights in the ECHR, acceded to by all member states, have the same 
scope as there (52: 3), though allowing the Charter and Union law to exceed them. 
This concession to the sphere minimalist in the event allowed a fairly maximalist 
view of the scope of social rights to enter into the Charter, even when it was doubtful 
                                                 
48   This ‘trade-off’, explored below, was struck by Iñigo Mendez de Vigo in the European 
Parliament delegation between the Socialists and Social Democrats, on the one hand, and the 
Conservatives and Christian Democrats, on the other.  
49   See Convention debate on 03.04.2000 as summarised in Deutscher Bundestag, Die Charta, pp 
253-54. The Cologne mandate had stated that social rights from documents like the European 
Social Charter should only be included ‘…insofar as they do not merely establish objectives 
for action by the Union’, a view supported by the head of the Convention secretariat, J. P. 
Jacqué, who argued that the Community could not promote human rights but only uphold a 
minimum set of judicially enforceable standards. (De Burca, ‘The Drafting’, pp. 134-5). As 
we shall see, the Convention partly dissented from this restricted view.   
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if they did fall within the EU’s competence, as was the case with social security (Art 
34) and health care (Art 35) (though these were only granted ‘in accordance with the 
rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices’.) 
  When it came to the tricky issue of the subjects of Charter rights, segregation 
provided the solution. The Cologne mandate had been ambiguous on this question, 
listing not only the supposedly universal rights contained in the ECHR, but also ‘...the 
fundamental rights that pertain only to the Union’s citizens’,
50 thereby implying not 
all the rights included in the Charter would automatically be rights of ‘every person’. 
Many Convention members expressed their concern about limiting rights to EU 
citizens, which some saw as incompatible with the substance of human rights as 
universal entitlements.
51 However, it was also possible that extending EU rights to all 
persons would result in a minimalist position as regards both their sphere and scope. 
The resolution of this complex dispute was a multi-layered compromise involving 
distinguishing five categories of rights according to their subject. So the ‘classical’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms (i.e. those taken mainly from the ECHR) are 
formulated as ‘rights of every person’, those rights based on the EC/EU Treaty 
provisions on citizenship are rights of ‘every EU citizen’, then there are rights, such 
as for example ‘social security and social assistance’ (Art 34) which are addressed to 
‘everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union...’, while some 
other rights (for example articles 27,28, 30 and 31) provide rights for ‘every worker’ 
or for ‘every child’ (art 24.3). Finally, the Charter introduces a new category of rights 
addressed to ‘any Union citizen and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a member state’ (Art. 42, 43 and 44). So, by segregating between 
                                                 
50   Conclusions of the Cologne European Council Meeting. 
51   Johannes Voggenhuber was most clearly against any restriction (interview 10.10.2000). Most 
other Convention members accepted that for practical reasons, and with reference to the 
Cologne mandate, the Charter would include different categories of rights holders.   
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different categories of rights and stipulating carefully who could hold them, the 
classes of people counting as subjects of EU rights could be expanded. 
  Nevertheless, not all issues relating to the identity of the subjects of rights 
could be dealt with in this way. A particularly pertinent example was the right to join 
and found political parties at the European level. Compromise on this right was only 
achieved by a form of trimming that involved moving from the particular policy to a 
higher level of abstraction. Originally the praesidium had proposed a separate article 
specifying that ‘every citizen’ had the right to join and found parties.
52 This proposal 
sparked a controversial debate over whether such an important political right could 
and should be restricted to EU citizens, and what provisions ought to be made for 
immigrants. In response, the praesidium proposed a second draft of this article which 
drew a distinction between the right to join a political party, which it gave to 
‘everyone’, and the right to found political parties, which was to be restricted to 
‘every citizen’.
53 After another debate and a number of written alternative proposals, 
the praesidium withdrew this idea and decided to drop the whole article from the 
Charter’s chapter on citizens’ rights. Instead, parties are now referred to only in the 
abstract in the second paragraph of Art. 12, which covers the much less 
controversially universal right of ‘freedom of assembly’.  
As the above examples show, compromises over one dimension of rights 
tended to interact with, and often ease, compromises in other dimensions. As a result 
of this process, agreement on the Charter as a whole gradually developed. However, 
there was always a danger of the various compromises coming apart whenever the 
ways they fitted together as part of a composite package came under close scrutiny. 
For reasonable disagreements remained, particularly over the substance of many 
                                                 
52   Convention 17 of 20.03.2000 
53   Convention 28 of 05.05.2000   
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rights and the status of the Charter. These differences were largely overcome by 
concentrating on particular issues and treating the decisions as the product of a 
pragmatic attitude of give and take rather than a consensus on rights. Indeed, 
sometimes the language of rights was dropped altogether.
 54 For example, in the areas 
of consumer and environmental protection, it proved impossible to settle on a formula 
based on individual rights. Instead, agreement was reached on a general policy aim or 
‘principle’ as it was termed. Thus, Article 37 does not give a right to a clean 
environment but merely declares ‘A high level of environmental protection and the 
improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of 
the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.’ 
Likewise, Article 38 states ‘Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer 
protection’. 
55  
The debate over the preamble to the Charter illustrates well the tensions 
dividing the Convention and the political mechanisms employed to resolve them. 
There was a general discussion early in the Convention about whether the Charter 
needed its own preamble, since it was to become either a part of the Treaties (in 
which case it would be preceded by their preambles) or a mere political declaration to 
which a prologue of some sort could be added later and not necessarily by the 
Convention. Yet, in the spirit of Herzog’s view that the Charter should be a self-
standing document that kept all options open, several individual Convention members 
proposed drafts for a preamble as did the praesidium.
56 The exchanges that followed 
once more brought to the fore the different visions among Convention members of 
                                                 
54   See the debate of 5 June 2000 over whether the Charter could distinguish between ‘genuine 
rights’ and ‘mere principles’ (Deutscher Bundestag, Die Charta, pp 279-84) 
55   In the 5 June debate (see n. 13) Herzog used the protection of the environment as an example 
of a ‘principle’ which was not an individual right, but should still bind the member states. 
Summarized in Deutscher Bundestag, Die Charta, pp 279-80. 
56   For example draft preamble by Manzella, Paciotti and Rodotà, Contrib. 175 (17.05.2000)   
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both European integration and the role and basis of the Charter, threatening to block 
final acceptance of even those articles which had already been agreed to.  
By the time the preamble came to be debated, it had been agreed that the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) should provide the minimum 
standards on a number of civil and political rights. Nevertheless, disagreements still 
existed over the role, scope, extent and legal function of social rights within the 
Charter, and more generally about the source and substance of rights. With regard to 
the first issue, the praesidium’s introduction in its first preamble draft of ‘solidarity’ 
as one of the ‘indivisible, universal principles’ on which the Union is founded was a 
major step. However, though it reflected the discussions thus far, it remained 
contentious.
57 Moreover, it became entangled with a debate over the second issue 
when a further controversy arose on the 19
th of July 2000 over the suggestion that the 
preamble should identify Europe’s cultural and, in particular, its religious heritage as 
the source of fundamental rights.
58 In response to the written contributions and 
discussions that followed, the praesidium’s third draft proposed to open the text with 
the phrase ‘(t)aking inspiration from [Europe’s] cultural, humanist and religious 
heritage, the Union is founded on the principles of...’.
59 However, this suggestion 
aroused such profound political disagreement that it appeared compromise would be 
impossible. On the one side, the French government’s representative, Guy Braibant, 
apparently argued within the praesidium that any reference to religion would be 
unacceptable to France and lead it to veto the whole Charter at the Intergovernmental 
Conference following the Convention. On the other side, the proponents of the 
religious reference (mainly German Christian Democrats from the EP delegation) 
                                                 
57   Presidium’s draft preamble contained in Document Convent 43 (14.07.2000) 
58   Some Christian democratic members of the Convention, especially Ingo Friedrich and Peter 
Mombaur arguing in favour, some socialist/social democratic members (notably Elena 
Paciotti and Ieke van den Burg) against. See Deutscher Bundestag, Die Charta. 
59   Presidium third draft preamble, contained in Document Convent 47 (14.09.2000)   
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were equally adamant. Given the tight time schedule (the impasse became apparent on 
September 14
th and the Convention was due to present a complete draft to the Biarritz 
European Council meeting on October 11
th) and the large number of issues still 
outstanding, two parallel dynamics evolved around this question: on the one hand, the 
praesidium attempted to construct a compromise based on its proposed text but 
involving linguistic segregation and trimming, on the other hand, the EP delegation, 
where disagreement was most pronounced, arranged a compromise through 
constructing a trade-off. 
  These two strategies emerged in part because of the praesidium’s decision that 
for the Convention to express a consensus on the Charter, each of its four 
components, namely the delegates of the 15 national parliaments, the European 
Parliament, the 15 national governments, and the European Commission, had to agree 
to it separately. Consequently, the first three held group meetings to discuss a draft of 
the whole Charter on the 25
th and 26
th of September. The types of compromise each 
adopted to resolve their remaining disagreements reflect important differences in their 
composition, purpose and style of politics. Trading came naturally to the EP delegates 
of the two main factions, (the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European 
People’s Party (EPP), who were used to doing deals with each other to resolve 
ideological disputes, especially as many votes within the EP require majorities of 
around 70% of those voting to be carried. Moreover, the need for some sort of 
compromise was inevitable given that the president of the EP delegation, Iñigo 
Mendez de Vigo (a Spanish Christian Democrat), had decided to follow the 
Convention’s method of reaching agreement without recourse to a vote. Faced with a 
division between the socialist (PES) and the conservative (EPP) blocs, Mendez de 
Vigo decided to tie the preamble problem to a number of other outstanding   
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controversial issues as part of a package deal. The reference to Europe’s rootedness in 
religion as demanded by the Right thereby got linked to the demands by the Left for 
the inclusion of a right to strike in the Charter and their desire for limitations to the 
right to own property. Though to some degree the motivations of the various actors 
have to be inferred from the available materials, it would appear that this package 
proved acceptable because each side gave a higher priority to getting their way on the 
issues they felt important than to preventing the other side achieving its goal. As a 
result, each could gain concessions from the other in their preferred policy area in 
exchange for agreeing to their opponents demands. The EP delegation thus ‘agreed’ 
on the de Vigo package, although two members (Kaufmann and Voggenhuber, neither 
members of the two large party families) registered their dissent. Therefore, Iñigo 
Mendez de Vigo took this as a mandate to ‘negotiate’ a solution within the 
praesidium. 
Meanwhile, the praesidium sought to trim the religious issue by replacing the 
controversial word ‘religieuse’ in the French original, with the word ‘spirituelle’, 
thereby finessing the debate.
60 While some Convention members, especially in the EP 
delegation, were still unhappy with this formula (which was too weak for some, and 
too strong for others), the prevailing feeling was one of relief that a solution had been 
found to a problem which had, in the views of many, grown out of all proportion to its 
importance. In yet another twist to the story, which bears witness to the complexity of 
the decision, two German and one Dutch Christian Democrat members of the EP 
delegation (Friedrich, Mombauer and van Damme) argued in direct consultation with 
the praesidium that the word ‘spiritual’ when translated into their respective 
languages would be too ambiguous and should therefore be rendered as ‘spiritual-
                                                 
60   Document Convent 48 of 26.09.2000   
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religious’ in the German and Dutch versions. The German members apparently found 
support from Roman Herzog (himself a Christian Democrat) for their case, and the 
German version of the Charter preamble consequently reintroduces the notion of 
‘religious’ although the Dutch version follows the other nine official languages in not 
mentioning it. Thus, a form of ‘segregation’ occurred between the different language 
communities. Several other German-speaking members of the Convention objected to 
such special treatment, but by this stage the issue was no longer sufficiently important 
to generate much debate. 
Thus, as figure one indicates, the Charter involved multiple compromises over 
each dimension of rights. A ‘constitutional’ consensus could not be found through 
convergence on a uniquely reasonable position. Instead, mutually acceptable 
concessions between reasonable and occasionally incompatible views were sought 
and found. These compromises involved bargaining as much as deliberative 
argument, although the latter more often than not informed the former, which were 
founded as much in conflicts of principle as in competing interests. In many cases, it 
was not the right itself that was in dispute so much as the policy implications that 
might be drawn from a given interpretation of it. Sometimes, as in the debate over the 
right to join and found parties, the issue was resolved by trimming to a level of 
abstraction that left the right sufficiently fuzzy as to allow a variety of interpretations. 
However, in most cases the desire was to reduce the scope for judicial discretion by 
either segregating the right to protect national jurisdictions or specifying a given 
interpretation, in which case a trade-off usually was necessary over some other right 
in another policy area. As a result, the Charter came to resemble a piece of ordinary 
legislation not just in the way it was framed, but also in its substance.   
 
30
The need for compromise might be attributed to the absence of voting 
producing the search for near unanimous decisions. As we noted, however, within the 
context of normal EU politics super-majorities are not unusual. Moreover, use of 
majority voting can itself be regarded as a form of compromise – the acceptance of a 
procedural device when it proves impossible to do any more than agree to disagree 
while accepting the need to reach a decision by a fair means. Indeed, on at least one 
occasion during the debate over social rights, some members felt a vote would have 
been more suitable than conceding ground to what many felt had become an 
unreasonable minority view. Several also argued that indicative votes at various 
points would have given a clearer picture of the state of debates in the Convention and 
could have speeded up the process.
61 Ultimately, the search for unanimity was itself a 
procedural compromise that was felt necessary to reach agreement on the Charter and 
secure its long-term acceptance. 
 
Conclusion 
The convention to draft the Charter was thought in many quarters to offer a new 
method for legitimating European integration – one that differed from the normal 
politics of compromise held to characterise inter-governmental conferences where 
principle was allegedly subordinated to national interests.
62 The decision to employ a 
convention to discuss the Future of Europe and draft a new European constitution was 
partly motivated by this supposed difference between constitutional and normal 
politics.
63 We have argued this contrast is overdrawn. The convention setting can help 
                                                 
61   e.g. Voggenhuber “Die Wahrheit’. 
62   E.g. Florence Deloche-Gaudez, ‘The Convention on a charter of Fundamental Rights: a 
Method for the Future’ - Notre Europe Policy Paper 15 November 2001 http://www.notre-
europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Etud15-en.pdf 
63   Jo Shaw, ‘Process, Responsibility and Inclusion in EU Constitutionalism’, European Law 
Journal, 9 (2003), pp.53-54.   
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filter out overtly self-serving arguments but it cannot funnel reasoning towards a 
consensus that abstracts from and rises above normal politics. To a great extent, this is 
because matters of principle, such as rights, are subject to the reasonable 
disagreements that animate normal political debate. Moreover, given these 
disagreements result from the complexity of people’s circumstances and experiences, 
compromises not only are achieved using the stratagems of normal politics but also 
reflect the prevailing normal political divisions on the issues of the day. The main 
achievement of constitutional politics is not to resolve or go beyond these divisions so 
much as to render people aware of them and to normalize them within mutually 
acceptable agreements that take them into account. In this respect, the comparative 
representativeness of both conventions has been crucial, as has been their relative 
openness to civil society.
64 Yet this inclusiveness makes the need for compromise 
more rather than less likely, since it almost certainly increases the diversity of views 
and interests that need to be accommodated. 
  Are the results of such processes compromised as a result? Those disappointed 
by what they regard as the unfortunate political manoeuvring of both the Charter 
convention and more especially that on the Future of Europe might be tempted to 
argue that academics, bureaucrats or members of the judiciary rather than politicians 
should draft constitutional documents. Such a proposal would be misguided. First, 
there is no reason to believe that any group containing the standard range of views on 
these questions would be any less likely to diverge on the points that have divided 
these (and other) conventions. After all, constitutional courts frequently split and have 
to make decisions by majority vote, while their agreements are often ‘incompletely 
                                                 
64   For an assessment of how far these virtues are to be found in the Convention on the Future of 
the Union, see Shaw, ‘Process, Responsibility and Inclusion in EU Constitutionalism’, 
European Law Journal, 9 (2003), pp. 53-67.   
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theorised’ and either trim from their principled disagreements or involve negotiation 
on the basis of analogies with other cases.
65 Second, a frequent complaint about the 
EU is that too many important decisions get taken by experts and technocrats. As the 
elected representatives of citizens, politicians arguably have greater standing 
legitimately to make what are necessarily political choices on their behalf. Indeed, 
António Vitorino, the Commission representative, believed the ‘wise combination of 
the Community and national sides and, above all, the parliamentary predominance 
will help bolster the draft Charter’s legitimacy in the eyes of a public that is often 
critical of the complex decision-making machinery at European level.’ 
66  A 
supposedly ideal normative consensus would simply have indicated the exclusion of a 
number of widely held positions from the drafting body and so delegitimise its 
conclusions.
 67 Finally, this argument misconceives the role of a constitution. The 
necessary employment of normal politics within constitution-making reflects the 
purpose of constitutions themselves as much as the process of drafting them. Rather 
than treating constitutions as somehow superior to and literally constituting normal 
politics, they should be seen as a form of mutual recognition that normalises political 
divisions.
68 Their success lies not in remaining outside normal politics but in 
informing it – and not merely via blind obedience to constitutional norms but also 
through citizens critically challenging and defending them. In other words, perhaps 
the prime virtue of the normality of constitutional politics resides in turning the 
resulting constitution into part of the basic vocabulary of normal political debate. It 
                                                 
65   Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, Ch 3.  
66   Quoted in de Búrca. `The Drafting’, p. 131 n. 17. 
67   It is noteworthy how often the term compromise has been used approvingly in regard to the 
draft EU constitution, just released at the time of writing. For example, the pro-EU Le Monde 
15-16 June 2003 even headlined its report ‘Un texte de compromis pour un Union á 25’. 
 
68   Shaw, ‘Process, Responsibility and Inclusion’, pp. 47-52 and J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 30.   
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achieves this effect not through by-passing everyday political divisions but by 
engaging with and reflecting them using the resources of normal politics.
  
  This last point raises a more general issue about the status of constitutional 
charters with regard to normal legislative processes. If Charters are akin to normal 
legislation in both their drafting and their content, ought we to give them special 
production and make them a source for the judicial review of the laws passed by the 
legislature? Doing so might itself be seen as a necessary compromise if certain issues 
are so divisive, or people deemed so careless or myopic, that they are likely only to be 
handled reasonably through trimming them from the normal political agenda and 
handing their protection to a third party.
69 Yet there is also the danger that a Charter 
could freeze a given position or prove so vague in its guidance as to give undue scope 
to judicial discretion. For example, both criticisms have been raised against the EU 
Charter. Whilst some see it as a turning point in the EU’s evolution,
70 others believe 
the EU is evolving so fast that it is premature.
71 The difficulty is that those rights that 
are clearly spelt out may merely reflect current concerns and become outdated, while 
those in more contentious areas are so loosely formulated they could be interpreted in 
quite contradictory ways. For example, two of the main issues for the future of the EU 
concern its competences vis-à-vis the member states, especially with regard to social 
policy, and the status of third country nationals. As we noted, these were areas where 
the Charter employed extensive trimming and segregation. It could be the very 
mention of these topics within the Charter will ensure that future policy takes the 
                                                 
69   This is a standard argument for rights-based judicial review e.g. S. Freeman, ‘Constitutional 
Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review’, Law and Philosophy , 9 (1990), pp. 353-4 
 
70   E.g. E. O. Eriksen, ‘Why a Charter of Fundamental Rights?’, in E. O. Eriksen et. al., The 
Chartering of Europe, Oslo, Arena Report No. 8/2001, pp. 29-52. 
71   J H H Weiler, ‘Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?’, European Law 
Journal, 6 (2000), pp. 95-97.   
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rights involved extremely seriously.
72 Yet, the experience of domestic charters 
suggests this may involve legislatures either leaving principled issues up to courts or 
seeking to anticipate their judgements. Either way, politicians (and to some degree 
ordinary voters too) will have ceased to think about rights and discuss them for 
themselves.
73 Moreover, in circumstances of deep disagreement, a court’s 
interpretation may be as divisive as any other,
74 so that its and the Charter’s authority 
themselves become an issue within the political debate, putting the legitimacy of EU 
institutions into question and reducing the capacity of the system to broker necessary 
compromises. Arguably, something like this scenario has arisen in Canada over 
precisely these sorts of concerns.
75 In such circumstances, it may be better to improve 
the competency of normal politics to decide such constitutional questions – especially 
if they are likely to be raised on an almost continuous basis. This proposal would 
involve designing normal political institutions in such a way that compromises had 
the openness and fairness we found in the Convention. For instance, instead of 
seeking to discover a definitive list of EU competences or agree on the principles that 
might decide this issue, both impossible tasks – as the numerous attempts to give 
substance to the term subsidiarity has revealed all too well, the draft Constitution for 
the EU suggests allowing national parliaments to contest extensions of the EU beyond 
                                                 
72 Rights-foundationalists, who advocate far-reaching judicial review, often make this sort of claim for 
Bills of Rights (e.g. R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 
32).  
73   See A Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 for the 
European experience and M. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, 
Princeton: PUP, 1999 for the US. 
74   Indeed, it may well suffer from falling short of people’s expectations as to substance and 
scope while overreaching them as regards the sphere of the EU. For a critique of past 
performance in this regard see J. Coppel, and A. O'Neill, `The European Court of Justice: 
Taking Rights Seriously?', Common Market Law Review 29 (1992), pp. 669-92. 
75   J Fudge, ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution and the Imperialism of 
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what they regard as its legitimate sphere.
76 Such democratic mechanisms reflect the 
contemporary need for constitutional settlements to be open to a continuous process 
of democratic legitimation in order to respond to the evolving and differing ideals and 
interests of their citizens and the rapid changes of modern economies and societies. 
  In sum, the difference between constitutional politics and normal politics is 
not as deep as it is often claimed. Many ‘constitutional’ questions can and have to be 
solved by normal politics, and the institutions of a political system should be designed 
to allow a normalised constitutional dialogue. Constitutional conventions, such as the 
current Convention on the Future of Europe, may help kick start a global process of 
reform. But if constitutional politics is simply a version of normal politics, reifying 
the compromises achievable at a particular time within a constitutional settlement 
may prove a considerable hindrance to any future, incremental reforms made 
necessary by changing circumstances and views. Given the rapid expansion and 
growing diversity of the EU and the dramatic transformations of modern economies 
and societies, such limitations are likely to be encountered sooner rather than later. 
Therefore, in the medium to long term, the redesign of normal politics to allow 
constitutional issues to be regularly debated, deployed and developed with due 
consideration may be preferable to taking them off the political agenda altogether or 
reserving them exclusively to extraordinary fora. In other words, constitutionalists 
should focus attention on the political constitution of the polity or organisation, that is 
its system of on-going decision making for the settling of differences, rather than on 
vain attempts to establish legal, rights based constitutional foundations that seek to go 
beyond political divisions. 
77  
                                                 
76   Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, CONV 
850/03, para. 5, p. 230. 
77   Significantly, Part III Title IV on the workings of the Institutions proved among the most 


























                                                                                                                                            
perspective argued for here, the proposals for revision are too complex and make reform too 
difficult. Even changes to part III (the EU policies) technically require a full treaty revision 
procedure, with unanimity in the Council, national ratification including referenda where 
necessary, and so on. (Part IV Art IV-5, CONV 850/03 p. 224).    
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Type of Compromise  Dimension of Rights 
bargaining trimming segregation trimming third  party 
arbitration 
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